Conventional Morality: Seeking Universal Moral Guidance from the Geneva Conventions

Abstract:
Political deliberation in western liberal democracies is in a crisis. Moral relativists, from Aristotle and Hegel to Hayek and Habermas, have effectively dismantled the metaphysical moral foundations of rational discourse – at least, in theory. Contemporary political discourse has devolved into battles of primitive rhetoric, rationalization, and outright coercion. Political actors operate under increasingly disparate worldviews – a result of increasingly pluralistic democracies and contextualization of "truth." Contemporary sociologists and political scientists struggle to define universalities necessary to even begin constructive debate. While academic consensus of a foundation for deliberation will likely never be reached, it is vital to find quasi-universal, functional and practical inter-subjective truths from which formal discourse can begin. In this essay, it is offered that the practical necessity of warfare has offered us a foundation for communicative action. Regardless of conflicting faiths, values, and ethics, the overwhelming majority of the global population lives within states that have ratified the Geneva Conventions – rules of warfare from which inter-subjective values can be deduced. States that have ratified the Geneva Conventions should extend the underlying ethical foundations to political discourse of internal affairs and public policy debates – for the benefit of all citizens.

I just want to say, you know, can we all get along? Can we get along? Can we stop making it horrible for the older people and the kids?... It’s just not right. It’s not right.... I mean, we’re all stuck here for a while. Let’s try to work it out. Let’s try to beat it.

– Rodney King, 1992. Los Angeles, USA

While acknowledging that I may be peddling an incarnation of a hackneyed theme - that things were better in the past - I would postulate that if a metric of societal dissonance [Footnote 1] were possible, we would find our global society at a historical peak. This is not necessarily a bad thing. This dissonance is partially a product of increased interaction between heterogeneous cultures that were historically isolated and insulated. Dissonance is a natural result of the unprecedented cultural interaction allowed by modern transportation and information technology. In spite of perpetual dynamic tension, these globalizing forces have lead to unprecedented international and intercultural collaboration and understanding. Skilled diplomats have always been aware of the cultural differences through which discourse must function. Identifying inter-subjective values from which to proceed with productive deliberation is an ancient and practiced art.

The disconcerting division of contemporary societal dissonance is that which occurs within nation states. National governments must function as deliberative bodies. In western democracies, these deliberative bodies are run not by professional diplomats, but  by elected representatives. In climates of national societal dissonance, there are signs that functional democracies are breaking down.

Throughout most of human history, people were relatively geographically immobile. Thus, when systems of government and nation states were formed, they were organized by a relatively homogeneous population, sharing a common cultural and contextual background. Democratic discourse could proceed with broad tacit knowledge and comparable world-views. In contrast, in contemporary western society, unprecedented social liberalism and geographic mobility are producing increasingly pluralistic societies. Such societies, with the United States as the exemplar, provide a challenge to the practical effectiveness of deliberative democracy. The inter-subjective values and tacit knowledge that form the basis of rational argument are increasingly disappearing.


This challenge to democracy is ironically compounded by the increasingly democratic inclusivity of modern western states. Early democracies were necessarily republican in nature. Ancient Greek city-states, the Roman Assemblies, to democratic states in the Age of Enlightenment and the Progressive Era - these operated on democratic principles, but this democratic ideal was heavily tempered by societal structures and technical limitations. Citizens were isolated from political deliberation by the state of communication and information technology. Thus, regardless of the democratic process of representative election, political deliberation was generally autonomous from democratic oversight. In the contemporary age of instantaneous and quasi-comprehensive information, the isolation and autonomy of the polis has been revoked. Elected representatives are instantly and reflexively held accountable for every action of formal deliberation - and many informal actions. The electorate is now engaged at every level of debate, bringing with them the incongruous multiplicity of values inherent in a pluralistic society. [Footnote 2]

Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.

- John Maynard Keynes

In contemporary "postmodern" western society, foundational values and truths have been philosophically discounted in rational secular discussion. Moral relativists, from Aristotle and Hegel, to Hayek and his paradigmatic Austrian School of Sociology, have rationalized objective truth to death. Paradoxically, many of the pseudo-rational [Footnote 3] academics that have accepted the divorce of rationality from objectivity, are the most intrinsically inclined to want to use rational moral foundations in political discourse. They believe that there is good, and they want to do good, but they just can't define what good is. I accept the rationality of pure subjectivity, and will avoid (to the greatest extent possible) assumed framings of good and bad. I instead define these morally-inclined rational-minded contingents as humanistic. The Austrian School theorists and others, who celebrate the demise of foundational morality, I define as egocentric.


As the framework of public political deliberation has lost most semblances of rational discourse, all that remains is rhetoric and coercion - which are two sides of the same coin. Rhetoric is most coercive when masquerading as rationality. In truth, it is rarely the strength of logic that wins an argument. It is the logic of strength and the strength of conviction. Political actors who act as though they are right (if not righteous) hold the high ground in deliberation. I define three types of political actors: rational humanists, egocentrists, and true moralists.


The most powerful actors are the true moralists – vestiges of ethical evolution who are yet destined to forever remain the majority of the populace. True moralists are necessarily too committed to the comfort and convenience of their personal worldviews to consider moral subjectivity (or otherwise too dull to understand that metaphysical morality has been deductively destroyed). True moralists act with what they believe to be true rationality, and thus with absolute conviction. Rarely is this rationality in the style of Kant and his contingent. In most cases, contemporary rationality is rooted in Moses or other religious traditions. Faith is more than a comfort in times of trial; it is clarity in times of confusion, and thus it is power in times of action. Martin Luther King, for example, was a true moralist - as was Jesus. [Footnote 4] Yet, so were most segregationists who opposed King - as were those who crucified Christ. The distinguishing feature of a true moralist is the conviction with which they act, not the ethics of their intent.


While I have defined true moralists as the most powerful class of political actors, it is a qualified definition. True moralists are the most powerful actors on the political stage, but politics is only an extension of the socio-economic world. Moralists are most often sentient puppets - they are willful and unpredictable, but are still manipulatable through the efforts of their masters. Holding the strings are the egocentrists. Egocentrists have no true moral convictions. They may be deliberate liars, or (as is more often the case) calculatedly schizophrenic. They know the rules of rationality, but deny (or conveniently forget) that such rules consume themselves. Their rhetoric is presented as rationality. Egocentrists are self-centered by definition, and often hedonistic. Their views are not necessarily immoral, merely amoral. If truth and morality are relativistic, and an individual desires power, it is rational that such individual should seek power, or at least assuage such desires with hedonic satisfaction. Of the true moralists, it may be said: Forgive them.... they know not what they do. Egocentrists warrant no such leniency. They are calculated in their deliberations, whatever the intent. However, as with a true moral foundation, an egocentric foundation is neither good, nor bad. Many egocentrists, for example, are exceedingly altruistic – for the reason that it makes them feel good about themselves.


The perennial underdogs of the political arena are the rational humanists. Humanists are handicapped in the political arena by a peculiar paradox: they want to do good, but they can't define what good is. They've become adept at rationality, and so have divorced good from God. With this construct, rationality consumes itself like a snake swallowing its own tail, and objective concepts of good are swallowed with it. In a war of power and rhetoric, humanists have voluntarily disarmed. A humanist's rhetoric is presented as such – mere rhetoric - and thus is weak. Any rationality is implicitly hollow. Their voice lacks conviction. Occasionally, humanists may appropriate enough true moralists to steer the debate. More often though, humanist views are drowned out by the egocentrists and their moral puppets. Often, humanist views are best drowned out; they are indecisive and conflicted as to what is a just cause. Sometimes, they're just wrong.

A Republic, if you can keep it.

– Benjamin Franklin

If a society cannot approximate consensus of a set of fundamental values from which to begin discourse, communicative action cannot proceed. If communicative action cannot proceed, political discourse reverts to exercises of power and rhetoric. If all political discourse is power and rhetoric, the republic has failed. Fearing this eventuality, humanistic political scientists and sociologists have been struggling to conceive a framework for practical rational deliberation ever since they disposed of objective truth. [Footnote 5] German philosopher/sociologist Jurgen Habermas, for example, has spent his career attempting to identify a "universal core of moral intuition." [Footnote 6]


Habermas' latest treatise, Between Facts and Norms (1998), attempts to deduce morality from "the principle of democracy," itself. But considering the wide functional disagreement with what the principles of democracy are, his argument is self-defeating. [Footnote 7] While morality may be indefinable, ethics may provide a functionally acceptable substitute. Morality is metaphysical in nature and falls apart under rational scrutiny. Ethics is not vulnerable to rational scrutiny; it is an accepted abstraction specifically employed to make communicative action possible. It does not necessarily require moral foundation. In practice, however, ethical principles are normally founded on moral beliefs - making inter-subjective ethical principles almost as difficult to come by as inter-subjective moral principles. Fortunately, the utility of society has provided a few exceptions – arenas of discourse where ethic principles are widely accepted.


Ironically, one arena where ethical consensus has been obtained is that of modern warfare. Warfare has operated under various regulations, formal or informal, throughout modern history. Leaders of nations have long accepted the necessity and value of international discourse through physical exercises of power, and have been inclined to accept inter-subjective ethical foundations from which such discourse can productively proceed. Sun Tsu said: "The art of war is of vital importance to the state.... Captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. This is called using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength". [Footnote 8]


The contemporary incarnation of these ethical foundations are embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, treaties that have become the basis of international humanitarian law. The conventions describe extensive ethical principles and humanitarian standards that are to be extended to citizens of hostile nations in times of war. It is a queer fact that in many cases, prisoners of war are bestowed with broader human rights than a nation's own citizens.


I suggest that rational humanists appropriate this ethical code as a functional set of universal values. Citizens are already protected by these conventions, but only under the condition of capture by hostile forces. Humanists should appeal to their governments to consider the same human rights for their own citizenries in times of peace. Even if precise ethical definitions cannot be agreed on, the mere consideration of Geneva Convention ethics as foundational to discourse amplifies the arguments of humanists by providing them an inter-subjective pseudo-moral soapbox on which to stand.


The four conventions apply to: (I) surrendered solders on land, (II) surrendered solders at sea, (III) prisoners of war, and (IV) civilians in occupied territory. Common to all four conventions is Article 3:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) taking of hostages;

(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

From Article 3 and the specific clauses in the respective conventions, a set of inter-subjective ethical principles can be deduced. The basic deduction of ethical principles is generally clear. The precise definition and division of these principles is subjective to a point. I have exhumed and divided what I interpret as six basic human rights embedded in the conventions. These include:


1. Right to Life (and Freedom from Torture)


The right to life is clear, and fundamental. It is both a limitation and obligation of the State. The state may not take the life of protected persons (except in rare cases [Footnote 9] ). This right is defined here to also include the right to freedom from all physical and psychological torture. The state is also obligated to provide a secure environment that prevents violent crime to the extent possible.


2. Right to Basic Human Needs (Water, Food, Shelter)


Under the Geneva Conventions, it is a responsibility of the state to provide for basic human needs if the protected persons are unable to provide for themselves. Clean and sufficient drinking water must be available. For POWs, "the basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies." For an occupied citizenry, the State is responsible to ensure that "protected persons shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigours of the climate and the effects of the war. In no case shall permanent places of internment be situated in unhealthy areas or in districts the climate of which is injurious to the internees."

3. Right to Legal Justice


Member states of the Geneva Conventions are required to provide a broad range of legal rights to protected persons, including provision of legal counsel if the accused is unable to obtain such. [Footnote 10]


4. Right to Health Care


Under the Geneva Conventions, states are obligated to provide access not only to medical providers, but also to preventive care such as monthly medical examinations and facilities that allow the practice of hygiene. For POWs, "the costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of prisoners of war in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power."


5. Right to Personal Dignity


"Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour." Under the Geneva Conventions, the state is explicitly restricted from "humiliating treatment" of all protected peoples. This applies not only to interrogations, but to general living and working conditions.


6. Right to Stimuli


By this, I use the word stimuli as the antithesis of boredom. While this may initially seem superfluous to human rights, the Geneva Conventions recognize extreme boredom (sensory deprivation) as a form of torture. However, language in the forth convention warrants the classification of stimuli as a separate right beyond freedom from torture. In the case of civilian internees, "the Detaining Power shall encourage intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst internees, whilst leaving them free to take part in them or not. It shall take all practicable measures to ensure the exercice thereof, in particular by providing suitable premises. All possible facilities shall be granted to internees to continue their studies or to take up new subjects. The education of children and young people shall be ensured; they shall be allowed to attend schools either within the place of internment or outside. Internees shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor games. For this purpose, sufficient open spaces shall be set aside... Special playgrounds shall be reserved for children and young people." [Footnote 11] 

The hottest places in Hell are reserved for those who in time of great moral crises maintain their neutrality.

- Dante

I can't say if it's right or wrong that many nations impart more human rights to their prisoners of war than they do to their citizens. I can only say for certain that I don't like it. Consider the irony: In the United States, if a man is homeless, hungry, and sick, he can reliably receive shelter, food, and medical attention – as soon as he commits a crime. How has this become the status quo? I believe there must be a better way. I believe we can provide for our neighbors as generously as we provide for our criminals and our conquered. I believe that there is good, and I want to do good, but I just can't define what good is. And if I can't define goodness for myself, how can the myriad of political actors in pluralistic democracies hope to establish foundational principles from which to begin constructive debate?


Conclusion:


I've proposed in this essay that the most universal set of ethical values available is embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. I have deciphered six core values that I believe the conventions are built upon, quasi-universal human rights to Life, Basic Needs, Legal Justice, Health Care, Personal Dignity, and Stimuli. The definition and division of the underlying ethical principles is not important. What is important is that these inter-subjective values have been ratified by nearly all of humanity; they imply a functional global moral code! They describe the way that nations have agreed to treat each others' citizens in times of war, and thus imply universal inter-subjective ideals of human rights. Is it unreasonable for citizens to ask for the same considerations from their own governments in times of peace? I think not. It pains me to see my fellow citizens denied accepted human rights.

As you have done to the least of these my brothers, you have done to me.

- Jesus Christ (Matthew 25:40)

End Notes:
[1] This is not a pre-defined term that I am aware of. I have selected it as a constructive abstraction, as I believe that a strict definition would actually detract from the utility of the concept. While this term in English has many meanings, it is traditionally defined musically. For example: "An unstable tone combination is a dissonance; its tension demands an onward motion to a stable chord. Thus dissonant chords are 'active'; traditionally they have been considered harsh and have expressed pain, grief, and conflict" (Kamien, Roger [2008]. Music: An Appreciation, 6th Brief Edition, p.41).
[2] This paragraph raises questions regarding the impact of government transparency. The assumption that increased transparency is universally beneficial for democracy is rarely, if ever, challenged. Can a democratic republic function operationally under unlimited public scrutiny? What is the optimum amount of transparency? This line of thought is outside of the scope of this essay, but additional consideration may be warranted.
[3] In this discussion, it is difficult (impossible, technically) to define rationality. Philosophers have effectively used rationality to disprove objective and metaphysical constructs such as morality and truth. But then rationality, the tool itself, collapses under its own weight. So then has objective truth really been disproven? This essay uses the term "rational," but this paradoxical "pseudo-rationality" is implied throughout.
[4] According to John, and, to a lesser extent, Luke and Matthew, Jesus preached universal love. The Jesus portrayed in the gospel of Mark is more of a traditional apocalyptic messiah (Wright, 2009).
[5] Egocentrists on the other hand, have discovered a cause célèbre in neoliberalism – the assertion that market logic applied to all aspects of life will reveal implicit ideas of truth that are as functionally universal as possible. Thus egocentrists have gained another advantage: a belief system, a secular faith – a reverence of a concept as abstract and idealized as any previous notion of God or truth: a free market. An ideal free market in the technical sense has never existed, and never will. It's an abstraction. It's an ideal. In political discourse, however, these qualifications don't matter. It's a Saint. See (Pennington, 2002), for an example of Hayekian-neoliberal viewpoint.
[6] Quoted in (Prychitko & Storr, 2007, p. 264).
[7] The thesis of Between Facts and Norms is respectfully but thoroughly dissembled in (Prychitko & Storr, 2007).
[8] Sun Tsu. The Art of War, I.1, II.17-18
[9] The Geneva Conventions do allow for the death penalty of protected persons. Such a penalty, however, requires extensive procedure and oversight, contextual considerations, and broad legal rights and access for the accused.
[10] While most western nation-states technically provide equal legal protection to all citizens, it is salient to consider the correlation between access to the legal system and wealth. If justice is equivalent to wealth, this is a breach of Geneva Convention ethics.
[11] It is remarkable that the Geneva Conventions require such specific conditions on the quality of life of internment, yet many modern states allowed impoverished inner cities to be stripped of educational and recreational facilities. Under Geneva Convention ethics, states would be obligated to address the dearth of such facilities in impoverished areas.

Influential and Cited Works:

Flyvbjerg, B. (2003). Rationality and Power. In S. Campbell, & S. S. Fainstein, Readings in Planning Theory (pp. 318-329). Blackwell.

Habermas, J. (1993 [1991]). Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. (C. Cronin, Trans.) Cambridge and London: MIT Press.

Harvey, D. (1989). The Condition of Postmodernity. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.

Pennington, M. (2002). A Hayekian Liberal Critique of Collaborative Planning. Planning Futures: New Directions for Planning Thoery, 187-205.

Persig, R. M. (1974). Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (Bantam New Age Edition (1981) ed.). New York: Bantam.

Prychitko, D. L., & Storr, V. H. (2007). Communicative action and the radical constitution: the Habermasian challenge to Hayek, Mises and their descedents. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31, 255-274.

Wright, R. (2009). The Evolution of God.

The Book of Matthew.